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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Regional Planning ZONING-MINIMUM LOT SIZE AND THE GENERAL
WELFARE
Steel Hill Development, Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton
469 F.2d 956 (1st Cir. 1972)
The town of Sanbornton is located among the rolling hills of
southern New Hampshire within easy access of both Lake Winnipesau-
kee's summer vacation area and the major New Hampshire ski resorts.
It is also only one hundred expressway miles from Boston. To exploit
the demand of urban dwellers for second homes in such an attractive
and accessible area,1 Steel Hill Development, Inc. purchased 510 acres
of land with the intention of developing it into approximately 500
family units. Because the projected lot sizes were not within the mini-
mum limits established by the local zoning ordinance,2 Steel Hill nego-
tiated with the town planning board to secure approval for its proposals.
Although initially receptive to the cluster plan of development,3 the
1 During the 1960's southern New Hampshire was one of the fastest growing areas
in the country. Over 250,000 people now own vacation homes in New Hampshire, a
figure equal to almost half the total permanent population of the state. Kovach, New
Hampshire, a Booming Vacationland, Fights To Preserve Its Natural Beauty, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 1, 1971, § 1, at 17, col. 1. See generally Note, Protection of Environmental Quality
in Nonmetropolitan Regions By Limiting Development, 57 IowA L. Rav. 126 (1971).
2 Steel Hill Development, Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton, 469 F-2d 956, 958 (1st Cir.
1972), aff'g, 338 F. Supp. 301 (D.N.H. 1972). The town zoning ordinance, enacted pursuant
to N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 31:60-89 (1970), divided the town into several districts with
minimum lot requirements as follows:
General Residential and
Agricultural 35,000 square feet
Commercial
Recreational 15,000 square feet
Highway Commercial 35,000 square feet
Historical Preservation ...........
Forest Conservation 6 acres (261,360
square feet)
469 F.2d at 959 n.4.
Plaintiff's land, the contours of which were described as varying from "sloping to
hilly to steep hilly to clifflike with most of it ranging from hilly to steep hilly," was
in the General Residential and Agricultural District and thus was subject to a .75 acre
minimum lot requirement. Steel Hill Development, Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton, 338 F.
Supp. 301, 202, 305 (D.N.H. 1972).
8 The cluster zoning plan proposed by Steel Hill would have
combined individual homesites on lots of 25,000 square feet or more with home-
sites grouped in dusters of three to fifteen sites on lots of approximately 12,000
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town planning board began to reconsider in light of mounting opposi-
tion from the townspeople, who were concerned with both the popula-
tion growth 4 and environmental damage5 that might result from such a
square feet. The cluster sites were to have common land to equal or exceed
35,000 square feet.
Id. at 303.
According to Steel Hill, such a plan would be the "best use of the area and preserve as
much of the woodland as possible." Id. For a general discussion of duster zoning, see 1
E. Yos.nxy, ZONING LAW & PRAcTicE § 4-25, at 182-83 (3d ed. 1965).
At the initial planning board meeting, Steel Hill also presented two alternative plans
of development: a conventional plan which apparently was a last resort in case the
duster plan was not approved, and a plan for development of the area as a trailer park,
which was evidently introduced as a scare tactic to accentuate the desirability of their
cluster concept. 338 F. Supp. at 304.
Steel Hill's plan for duster development brings into sharp focus the conflict between
the rising demand for seasonal and permanent homes and the desire of communities
to stem the tide of development. Recognizing that even the most secluded or pic-
turesque towns will inevitably have to accommodate the increasing population, many
commentators have advocated the duster concept of zoning as a practical solution to this
problem. See generally Goldston & Scheuer, Zoning of Planned Residential Development,
73 HAmv. L. Ray. 241 (1959); Symposium: Planned Unit Development, 114 U. PA. L. REv.
3 (1965). For communities wishing to preserve open spaces, this method may provide
a more feasible alternative to minimum lot size ordinances than a patchwork pattern
of relatively isolated homes dotting an area. The use of a duster plan would mean that
whole areas would be free from development, with the concentration of homes confined
to a smaller portion of the zoning area. See National Land & Inv. Co. v. Easttown
Township Bd. of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504, 531, 215 A.2d 597, 611-12 (1965) (court
discounted benefit of large lot zoning as means of preserving open spaces, noting that
four-acre minimum lot size ordinance in question would have left area so zoned
"simply dotted with larger homes on larger lots"). See also M. WaHiLy, CLUsTER SuH-
DIMIONS AND ZOMNG, THE Ytmaoon oF AGRICuT=RE, A PLACE To LIvE 469 (1963)
(stating that "[alcreage zoning, mistakenly applied to create 'open development' . . . has
absorbed land at accelerated rates without producing increased amenity, desirable living,
economy of layout, convenience of access, or preservation of rapidly diminishing open
space. ) But see Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection and the
Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REv. 767, 797 (1969) (arguing that minimum lot zoning allows more
"rational and systematic absorption of new residents," and ensures controlled change of
growth. The control of density and population growth in an orderly manner has generally
been held a permissible zoning objective. See, e.g., J.D. Constr. Corp. v. Board of Adjust-
ments of the Township of Freehold, 119 N.J. Super. 140, 290 A.2d 452 (Law Div. 1972);
Golden v. Planning Bd. of Town of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 NXE.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d
138 (1972) (amendment to zoning ordinance restricting development until municipal services
available held constitutional). For a discussion of the Ramapo decision, see 47 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 723 (1972).
The few cases dealing with planned development have accorded it generally favorable
treatment. In Orinda Homeowners Comm. v. Board of Supervisors, 11 Cal. App. 3d 768,
90 Cal. Rptr. 88 (1970), the court held that a duster plan was in conformity with the
applicable zoning statute even though there was no uniformity among the individual
units within the development. In Chrinko v. South Brunswick Township Planning Bd.,
77 N.J. Super. 594, 187 A.2d 221 (Law Div. 1963), a duster zoning ordinance permitting
waiver of minimum lot size requirements when the developer deeded areas of the
zoned land for public purposes was upheld. See generally Annot., 43 A.L.R.3d 888 (1972).
4 At the time the suit was brought, Sanbornton had a stable population of ap-
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development. Consequently, an amendment to the zoning ordinance
was passed establishing new zoning districts and raising the minimum
lot requirements on existing districts." Seventy percent of the proposed
development now had a six-acre minimum lot requirement, while the
remaining thirty percent was rezoned for a three-acre minimum lot
size.7
Steel Hill then instituted a suit attacking the validity of the
amended ordinance, alleging claims of uncompensated taking of prop-
erty, denial of equal protection, and violation of due process. The dis-
trict court's rejection of all counts8 resulted in an appeal to the United
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. The circuit court upheld
both the three-acre and the six-acre minimum lot requirements in a
paradoxical decision that integrated current social considerations into
municipal zoning law, yet retreated to the narrow parochialism of un-
critical acceptance of local autonomy.9 The court recognized that the
proximately 1,000 people living in 380 homes. The summer influx swelled the number
to 2,000, who resided in the 400 seasonal homes in the area. The Steel Hill development
would expand the housing market by an additional 500 to 515 family units. Steel Hill
Development, Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 956, 958 (1st Cir. 1972).
5 See notes 30-86 and accompanying text infra.
6 The new districts and lot sizes were as follows:
General Residential 1.5 acres (65,340 sq. ft.)
Agricultural 8 acres (130,680 sq. ft.)
Commercial ..........
Recreational 1.5 acres (65,340 sq. ft.)
Highway Commercial .75 acre (85,000 sq. ft.)
Historical Preservation 1.5 acres (65,340 sq. ft.)
Forest Conservation 6 acres (261,360 sq. ft.)
Steel Hill Development, Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 956, 959 n.4. (Ist Cir. 1972).
The Forest Conservation District, as a result of the amendment, now covers approximately
half the town and encompasses the only area under development. Id. at 961.
7 Id. at 959.
8 Steel Hill Development, Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton, 838 F. Supp. 801 (D.N.H. 1972).
Steel Hill's primary contention was that the amended zoning ordinance resulted in a
confiscation of its property without just compensation. The district court emphasized that
large lot zoning had been upheld in many previous cases and was becoming the trend
in New Hampshire. Id. at 807. For a collection of cases upholding large lot zoning, see
Annot., 95 A.L.R.2d 716 (1964).
Employing a balancing test between the public interest of the Sanbornton towns-
people served by the zoning ordinance and the "economic burden" placed on the de-
veloper, the court found the ordinance valid. 888 F. Supp. at 807. Although Steel Hill
certainly suffered economic detriment by the rezoning, that has never been a controlling
factor in zoning review, absent a total prohibition of profitable use. See, e.g., Hadacheck
v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 894 (1915) (alleged 93% loss in property value did not invalidate
zoning ordinance). The court pointed out that Steel Hill's property can still be used for
vacation residences or farming. 838 F. Supp. at 307.
9 Steel Hill Development, Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 956 (Ist Cir. 1972).
Current social considerations in zoning cases, as evidenced by decisions in Pennsylvania and
New Jersey, involve the definition of the emerging legal right to a decent home. See notes
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case before it involved the "environmental revolution,"'' 0 the impact of
which has yet to be determined in the state and federal courts."' Noting
that "[d]ifficult and novel legal and factual questions are posed which
require the resolution of conflicting economic, environmental, and hu-
man values .... " and which "may never be solvable with any degree of
certitude,"' 2 the court nevertheless limited its review of the Sanbornton
zoning ordinance to the traditionally restricted scope of judicial ex-
amination of local legislative enactments.13
42-56 and accompanying text infra. Steel Hill goes a step further and considers the right
to a decent environment in which to build that home. The paradox results from the
court's subservience to traditional rules of zoning evaluations, rules whose perspective is
limited solely to an examination of property rights versus police power on the local
level, without regard to broader social objectives or regional impact.
10 The court accepted the district court's framing of the issue:
This case reflects the current clash between those interested in opening up new
and hitherto undeveloped land for sale and profit and those wishing to preserve
the rural character of Northern New England and shield it from the relentless
pressure of an affluent segment of our society seeking new areas for rest, recrea-
tion, and year round living.
338 F. Supp. at 302. See Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1971); Scenic Hudson
Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965). See also authorities cited
in note 1 supra.
11 The court suggested that since the federal government has recognized the sig-
nificance of environmental concerns in the National Environmental Policy Act (42 U.S.C.
§§ 4321-37 (1970)), so also may local communities in their zoning ordinances. The federal
statute is not explicit, nor have courts yet decided exactly what types of environmental
dangers are within the Act's coverage. Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1972),
construed the Act as encompassing more than just air and water pollution. Noise, traffic,
congestion, and overburdened transportation systems are also apparently within its
purview.
12 469 F.2d at 959.
13 The police power of a state, and the subsequent delegation of such power to
local communities, serves as the basis for all zoning laws. Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). See also Louis K. Ligget Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105
(1928); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905). The validity of an ordinance depends
upon the extent to which its goals are permissible objectives within the framework of
the police power. The means by which such goals are sought may not be arbitrary, dis-
criminatory, or unreasonable. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., supra at 395. The
permissible objectives, as conferred by most state statutes and accepted by the Supreme
Court in Euclid, are the furtherance of the "public health, safety, morals, or general
welfare." Id. See also N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 31:60 (1970) (zoning allowed "[flor the
purpose of promoting health, safety, morals, or the general welfare of the community").
In reviewing local ordinances, courts indulge in a strong presumption of validity. Village
of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., supra. This presumption is based in part on a desire
to avoid an investigation into social conditions felt to be beyond a court's competence,
and in part on a desire to preserve local autonomy by upholding local legislative de-
terminations. See Roberts, The Demise of Property Law, 57 CoRNErL L. Rav. 1, 16
(1971). Such a basis for judicial review has come under recent criticism for being too
restrictive in scope. See, e.g., National Land & Inv. Co. v. Easttown Township Bd. of
Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504, 522, 215 A.2d 597, 607 (1965). However, the court of appeals in
Steel Hill was unwilling to depart from established precedents. 469 F.2d at 959-60.
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Although supported by a firm line of precedent, 4 such a narrow
review runs counter to an emerging trend in other jurisdictions of a
broader and more forceful evaluation of local zoning ordinances. 15 The
court's approach also avoided the troublesome, and perhaps impossible,
task of delineating the precise extent to which environmental factors
may be considered in enacting zoning laws and the interplay of such
concerns with the equally unsettled area of local responsibility for
regional housing needs. 16
I
THE JUSTIFICATION OF SANBORNTON'S ORDINANCE
A. "General Welfare" as a Criterion for Zoning Review
Much of the argument and discussion over the scope of judicial re-
view and the standard of evaluation to be applied to zoning ordinances
has involved an attempt to satisfactorily define the parameters of per-
missible zoning objectives. While almost all states allow zoning only for
the purposes of health, safety, or the general welfare, case authority is
split on a comprehensive definition of each element and the interrela-
tion among them.17 As a rule, zoning for health and safety purposes
alone has been upheld by the courts, but zoning for the purpose of gen-
eral welfare, independent of any significant demonstrable health or
14 See, e.g., Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603 (1927); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); City of St. Paul v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 413 F.2d 762 (8th
Cir. 1969); Confederacion de la Raza Unida v. City of Morgan Hill, 324 F. Supp. 895
(N.D. Cal. 1971); Bilbar Constr. Co. v. Easttown Township Ed. of Adjustment, 393 Pa.
62, 141 A.2d 851 (1958). See generally Note, The General Public Interest vs. The Presump-
tion of Zoning Ordinance Validity: A Debatable Question, 50 J. URBAN L. 129 (1972).
15 This expansion of the scope of judicial review usually is based upon an examina-
tion of both the regional and broader social impact of a given ordinance, areas into
which earlier courts were reluctant to step. See, e.g., Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Town-
ship of Madison, 117 N.J. Super. 11, 283 A.2d 353 (Law Div. 1971); Concord Township
Appeal, 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970); Girsh Appeal, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970);
National Land & Inv. Co. v. Easttown Township Ed. of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d
597 (1965); Board of County Supervisors of Fairfax County v. Carper, 200 Va. 653, 107
S.E.2d 390 (1959).
16 See Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 117 N.J. Super. 11, 283
A.2d 353 (Law Div. 1971) (regional housing needs within general welfare and necessary
consideration for town zoning ordinance).
17 Two early Supreme Court decisions validated use of the police power under
differing rationales. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), seems to
have been decided solely on the basis of health and safety considerations, while a prior
decision upheld an exercise of police power based solely on the general welfare. Chicago,
B. & Q. Ry. v. Illinois ex rel. Drainage Comm'rs, 200 U.S. 561 (1906); see Roberts, supra
note 13, at 11-12.
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
safety concerns, has not received such favorable treatment.18 Much of
the confusion in this area is due to the lack of an adequate definition of
general welfare. For example, some courts have ruled that aesthetic
considerations are permissible zoning concerns under the general
welfare guise,19 as is the preservation of a town's rural character, 20
18 In National Land & Inv. Co. v. Easttown Township Bd. of Adjustment, 419 Pa.
504, 530, 215 A.2d 597, 611 (1965), the court indicated that general welfare should not
be used as a test because of the conceptual difficulty in formulating an adequate defini-
tion. See also Concord Township Appeal, 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970). But see Oak-
wood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 117 N.J. Super. 11, 283 A.2d 353 (Law
Div. 1971). In Oakwood at Madison, the court held that the general welfare must be
considered in all zoning cases and implied that it was a justifying criterion, independent
of health and safety considerations.
A comprehensive definition of general welfare has escaped the courts for many years.
The few cases that single out general welfare for consideration invariably define it in
vague, general terms. For example, in Lionshead Lake, Inc. v. Township of Wayne, 10
N.J. 165, 172, 89 A.2d 693, 697 (1952), the court stated: "[s]o long as the zoning ordinance
was reasonably designed, by whatever means, to further the advancement of a community as
a social, economic, and political unit, it is in the general welfare." See also Cunningham,
Land-Use Control-State and Local Programs, 50 IowA L. Rav. 367, 385 (1965) (noting
that after 50 years of judicial review term "general welfare" remains intensely undefined
as it relates to zoning").
19 Perhaps the leading case in this area is Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954), which
upheld the constitutionality of a plan to renovate blighted areas of the nation's capital.
In rather expansive language, Mr. Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, expressed
this view of general welfare:
The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive.... The values it repre-
sents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within the
power of the legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful
as well as healthy, spacious as well as dean, well-balanced as well as carefully
patrolled.
Id. at 33. See also Stone v. City of Maitland, 446 F.2d 83 (5th Cir. 1971) (enhancement of
aesthetic nature of area by regulation of distance between service stations permissible
zoning objective).
Zoning for aesthetic purposes has followed an erratic course during the last half
century. While zoning primarily for aesthetic reasons was rejected almost uniformly by
the courts in the early part of the century (see, e.g., Romar Realty Co. v. Board of
Comm'rs, 96 N.J.L. 117, 114 A. 248 (1921); see generally Annot., 21 A.IR.3d 1222, 1226-35
(1968)), a few recent decisions have reversed this trend. Several New York cases indicate
that aesthetic concerns alone may justify a zoning ordinance. See Cromwell v. Ferrier, 19
N.Y.2d 263, 225 N.E.2d 749, 279 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1967); People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 191
N.E.2d 272, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734, appeal dismissed, 375 U.S. 42 (1963); People v. Berlin, 62
Misc. 2d 272, 307 N.Y.S.2d 96 (Sup. Ct. 1970). See also Southern Alameda Spanish
Speaking Organization v. Union City, 424 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1970); Senior v. Zoning
Comm'n of New Canaan, 146 Conn. 531, 153 A.2d 415 (1959). But see DeMaria v. Enfield
Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 159 Conn. 534, 271 A.2d 105 (1970) (aesthetics not proper
consideration). The general rule, however, remains that aesthetic improvement is a com-
plementary purpose of zoning, but may not be a dominant factor. See Confederaion de
la Raza Unida v. Morgan Hill, 324 F. Supp. 895 (N.D. Cal. 1971); Piscitelli v. Township
Comm. of Scotch Plains, 103 N.J. Super. 589, 248 A.2d 274 (Law Div. 1968). For a general
discussion of aesthetics and zoning see, Dukeminier, Zoning for Aesthetic Objectives: A
Reappraisal, 29 LAw & CoNTEMP. PRoB. 218 (1955); Roda, The Accomplishment of Aesthetic
1040 [Vol. 58:1035
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or the stabilization of property values.21 Other courts, however, have
held that "general welfare" is merely a "catch-all" phrase embody-
ing only health and safety factors, and is not, therefore, an independent
justification for zoning.2 2 One court even suggested that general welfare
is incapable of judicial definition and consequently constitutes "an
exceedingly difficult standard against which to test the validity of
legislation."23
In Steel Hill, the court of appeals, in affirming the district court,
agreed that the three-acre minimum lot requirement was a reasonable
means of legislating for the public health since it was based upon drain-
age and sewerage needs.24 In so doing the court reaffirmed the notion of
earlier decisions that a zoning ordinance may be used as a means to
avoid an overuse of municipal services, a rationale rejected by many
Purposes Under the Police Power, 27 S. CAL. L. REv. 149 (1954). See also Masotti & Selfon,
Aesthetic Zoning and the Police Power, 46 J. UaBAN L. 773 (1969); Note, The Aesthetic
Factor in Zoning, 11 DuqOsNE L. REv. 204 (1972).
While the debate concerning the role of aesthetics has centered primarily around
visual aesthetics, the question of zoning to prevent environmental harm, although tradi-
tionally not considered an aesthetic purpose, is certainly relevant to the discussion. The
desire to alleviate water pollution, curb traffic congestion, and limit uncontrolled popula-
tion expansion is as much related to the eyesores such conditions create as to their
undesirable physical effects. Thus, in jurisdictions such as New York, which is willing to
recognize aesthetics as a permissible zoning objective, legislation to prevent environmental
damage through land use control may not encounter severe judicial roadblocks. Although
the Supreme Court has not addressed itself to this issue, the language of Mr. Justice
Douglas in Berman, quoted above, is entirely consonant with an approach that legitimizes
aesthetic and environmental zoning objectives.
20 See Senior v. Zoning Comm'n of Town of New Canaan, 146 Conn. 531, 153 A.2d
415 (1959); Simon v. Town of Needham, 311 Mass. 560, 42 N.E.2d 516 (1942); Norbeck
Village Joint Venture v. Montgomery County Council, 254 Md. 59, 254 A-2d 700 (1969);
County Comm'rs of Queen Anne's County v. Miles, 246 Md. 355, 228 A.2d 450 (1967);
Fischer v. Township of Bedminster, 11 N.J. 194, 93 A.2d 378 (1952). See also Greater
Bloomfield Real Estate Co. v. Bloomfield Township, 35 Mich. App. 437, 192 N.W.2d 513
(1971). But see Kavanewsky v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Warren, 160 Conn. 397,
279 A-2d 567 (1971) (desire to maintain town's rural character held impermissible zoning
objective). In many cases the preservation of a town's natural state will be directly con-
nected with a desire to protect against ecological harm. See, e.g., Golden v. Board of
Selectmen of Falmouth, 358 Mass. 519, 265 N.E.2d 573 (1970) (zoning bylaw having as
purpose protection of town's coastal resources upheld).
21 See Citizens Nat'l Bank of Downers Grove v. Village of Downers Grove, 265 N.E.2d
171 (Ill. App. 1970); Hartigan Oldsmobile Cadillac, Inc. v. City of Park Ridge, 130 Ill. App.
2d 156, 264 N.E.2d 386 (1970); People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 466, 191 N.E.2d 272, 274,
240 N.Y.S.2d 734, 737 (1963); State ex rel. Saveland Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland, 269
Wis. 262, 69 N.W.2d 217 (1955). For a discussion of the interrelation of property values and
aesthetics in zoning, see Note, supra note 19, at 222-23.
22 See Concord Township Appeal, 439 Pa. 466,268 A.2d 765 (1970).
23 National Land & Inv. Co. v. Easttown Township Bd. of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504,
530, 215 A.2d 597, 611 (1965).
24 469 F.2d at 960.
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recent cases.25 The three-acre requirement was not based directly on
the environmental claims, nor was it supported by considerations of
the general welfare.26
The six-acre requirement, however, required more extensive treat-
ment by the court. It was found to be unsupportable as a reasonable
means of protecting public health or safety, since there was insufficient
evidence to establish a rational basis between the six-acre minimum
and the feared consequences of development.27 It was held to be justi-
fiable, however, under the general welfare provision of the state enabl-
ing statute. 28 Thus, the court ruled that zoning legislation directed
solely toward the general welfare may be valid, independent of any
justifiable health or safety considerations.
B. Environmental Damage as a Permissible Concern Within
"General Welfare"
The evidence presented in Steel Hill suggests that the amended
Sanbornton zoning ordinance had multiple purposes. Although the
preamble stated that one of the objectives of the ordinance was the
preservation of the town's rural charm,29 it was clear to the court that
the planning board was also deeply concerned with the "orderly
growth" of the town.8 0 In addition, the planning board and town
residents expressed concern over the problems of slope drainage, soil
erosion, sewage disposal, and traffic congestion that were expected to
accompany the contemplated development.8 1 None of these considera-
tions, however, was unique; they had been accepted as permissible con-
siderations by some jurisdictions, and rejected by others, for over forty
years. 2
25 Girsh Appeal, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970); National Land & Inv. Co. v. East-
town Township Bd. of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965); Mignatti Constr. Co.
Zoning Application, 3 Pa. Comm. 242, 281 A.2d 355 (1971).
26 The district court supported the validity of the three-acre requirement on
grounds of health and safety. 338 F. Supp. at 305.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 305-06. See N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 31:61-89 (1970).
29 338 F. Supp. at 304 n.3.
30 Id. at 304.
81 Id.
32 See generally Annot., 95 A.L.R.2d 716 (1964). The rationale that the avoidance of
a possible present or future burden on municipal services was a permissible zoning objective
was perhaps most convincingly dismissed in National Land & Inv. Co. v. Easttown Town-
ship Bd. of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1964), in which the court said: "A zoning
ordinance whose primary purpose is to prevent the entrance of newcomers in order to avoid
future burdens, economic and otherwise, upon the administration of public services and
facilities cannot be held valid." Id. at 532, 215 A.2d at 610. See also Mignatti Constr. Co.
Zoning Application, 3 Pa. Comm. 242, 281 A.2d 355 (1971).
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The primary significance of this case involves the claims of en-
vironmental damage that would result from the construction and
utilization of the proposed 500 residential units. Although no substan-
tial evidence was presented by the town,33 it was nevertheless alleged
that the amendment was prompted by fears of air pollution from the
anticipated increase in automobile traffic, water pollution in Lake
Winnesquam resulting from an increased burden upon sewage disposal
facilities, and possible destruction of smelt spawning grounds which
were an important natural resource of the area because they attracted
sport fishermen and were a necessary link in the ecosystem of Lake
Winnesquam's famous trout.34 In upholding these minimum lot re-
quirements, the decision recognizes that environmental concerns are
permissible zoning objectives to be furthered within the framework of
assuring the general welfare, although apparently not, at least with
respect to the amount of environmental damage alleged here, within
the purview of the more limited safety and health police power of the
states.35
33 There was conflicting evidence on the alleged environmental impact of the pro-
posed development. The lower court chose to side with the town, in part because of a
belief that developers are less than diligent in their adherence to efforts to preserve the
areas they develop. 338 F. Supp. at 305. While affirming the district court's conclusion,
the court of appeals was "disturbed .. . that there was never any professional or scientific
study made as to why six, rather than four or eight, acres was reasonable to protect the
values cherished by the people of Sanbornton." 469 F.2d at 962.
This lack of convincing concrete evidence of the development's environmental impact
raises doubts about the precise holding of the case. Rather than setting forth en-
vironmental concerns as a new factor to be considered in reviewing zoning ordinance
(see Salamar Builders Corp. v. Tuttle, 29 N.Y.2d 221, 275 N.E.2d 585, 825 N.Y.S.2d
933 (1971) (increasing minimum lot size upheld when concern was to avoid underground
water pollution by limiting number of septic tanks); Golden v. Board of Selectmen of
Falmouth, 358 Mass. 519, 265 N.E.2d 573 (1970) (zoning to protect coastal natural resources
upheld), it may be that the court was merely recognizing the validity of the ordinance
on the basis of preserving the town's essentially rural nature. On the other hand, the
court may have decided that neither ground standing alone was sufficient to support the
ordinance, but that the combination of the two goals constituted a permissible zoning
objective.
34 469 F.2d at 960. The holding that air pollution from traffic congestion is a per-
missible consideration seems to revive this objective from its rejection in National Land &
Inv. Co. v. Easttown Township Bd. of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504, 527-28, 215 A.2d 597, 610
(1965). The district court in Steel Hill suggested that since the dangers of increased
traffic, primarily air pollution, are no longer met merely by building new roads, the
failure to find an effective solution to this problem permits a town to contain uninhibited
traffic growth through zoning. 338 F. Supp. at 306. But see Alsenas v. City of Brecksville,
29 Ohio App. 2d 255, 281 N.E.2d 21 (1972).
35 This aspect of the decision would be important only in those jurisdictions which,
like New Hampshire, recognize the conceptual distinction between health and safety on
the one hand and general welfare on the other. This, however, leaves open the question
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C. The Determination of General Welfare
Steel Hill is significant in that while establishing a new factor to
be considered by courts in reviewing local zoning legislation, the scope
of that review is narrowly drawn. In ascertaining that Sanbornton's
legislative efforts in dealing with possible pollution were in furtherance
of the general welfare, the court considered only the effects on residents
of Sanbornton. The extraterritorial implications of the decision were
virtually ignored.86 Such myopic treatment, although in accord with
traditional judicial review of zoning cases, is currently being abandoned
in many jurisdictions.87 While here the decision may have no harsh ex-
traterritorial consequences, 38 the result may not always be so incon-
sequential. For example, in the future a similar ordinance may be
struck down for failure to prove environmental detriment within the
of what amount, if any, of asserted environmental damage would be sufficient to enable a
community to legislate against it through zoning under its health and safety power.
86 The court did, however, suggest that if a greater demand for land in the area
were shown it would reconsider its decision: "Were we to adjudicate this as a restriction
for all time, and were the evidence of pressure from land-deprived and land-seeking out-
siders more real, we might well come to a different conclusion." 469 F.2d at 962.
This presents a new factual twist to the traditional exclusionary zoning problem,
which typically involves the exclusion of low income groups from a locality. Recent
decisions have suggested that this practice is illegal. See, e.g., Southern Burlington County
NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 119 N.J. Super. 164, 290 A.2d 465 (Law Div. 1972)
(town cannot zone against poor people). Steel Hill involves the exclusion of those pre-
sumably in the upper and upper-middle income brackets. No case has yet invalidated a
zoning ordinance on such grounds.
37 Recently, many courts have defined general welfare in terms of its effect on a
regional basis, considering the impact of an ordinance not merely within the boundaries
of a given town, but also on the surrounding area. This is primarily evident in instances
where suburban zoning laws have noticeably curtailed outward urban expansion. In
Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 117 N.J. Super. 11, 20-21, 283 A.2d 353,
358 (Law Div. 1971), the court stated:
The general welfare does not stop at each municipal boundary. Large areas of
vacant and developable land should not be zoned . . . into such minimum lot
sizes and with such other restrictions that regional as well as local housing needs
are shunted aside.
See also Girsh Appeal, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970); Borough of Cresskill v. Borough
of Dumont, 15 N.J. 238, 104 A.2d 441 (1954).
When the examination is thus broadened, further complications arise in determining
how extensive a region should be considered in analyzing a given zoning ordinance. Courts
have not faced much of a problem in this connection as yet, since most of the cases
arising have involved suburban communities adjacent to large metropolitan areas. Steel
Hill represents the more difficult situation which courts taking a regional approach will
have to consider. Does a rural town such as Sanbornton situated in a relatively un-
developed area, have to evaluate its zoning ordinance in the context of its impact on
Boston, 100 miles away?
38 The town's character is preserved, the development is halted, at least in its
present form, and those seeking vacation homes still have the opportunity to purchase
elsewhere.
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town's borders. However, subsequent development thereby permitted
may have profound ecological impact on the surrounding area because
of peculiar topographic or climatic features. While Steel Hill nowhere
explicitly states a definite rule against regional considerations, the deci-
sion lacks the formulation of a definite geographic framework within
which the impact and consequences of an ordinance should be con-
sidered.39
II
THE EMERGING TREND IN ZONING REVIEW
Steel Hill represents a sharp contrast to recent cases which have
taken a markedly dissimilar approach to judicial review of zoning
ordinances. While large lot zoning has been upheld in various areas for
many years,40 the current approach, as exemplified by cases in Pennsyl-
vania and New Jersey, has been to treat such zoning with great suspi-
cion.
A. The Development of a Regional Approach to Minimum Lot
Zoning
In National Land & Investment Co. v. Easttown Township Bd. of
Adjustment,41 the Pennsylvania court struck down a four-acre minimum
lot requirement in Easttown, a suburb of Philadelphia. Recognizing the
growing demand for suburban housing,4 the court imposed an obliga-
tion upon Easttown to act responsibly with respect to this increased
population pressure, although the extent of this responsibility was
never clearly defined.43 In response to the town's assertions of thereto-
fore permissible zoning objectives, the court indicated that preservation
of rural character, fear of increased burdens on municipal services, and
aesthetic considerations were no longer sufficient to justify such an ex-
clusionary zoning ordinance in light of the pressing demand for homes
39 469 F.2d 956.
40 See Annot., 95 A.L.R.2d 71 (1964).
41 419 Pa. 504,215 A.2d 597 (1965).
42 See M. BROors, EXCLUSIONARY ZONING 1-4 (1970).
43 "The question posed is whether the township can stand in the way of the natural
forces which send our growing population into hitherto undeveloped areas in search of a
comfortable place to live. We have concluded not." National Land & Inv. Co. v. East-
town Township Bd. of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504, 532, 215 A.2d 597, 610 (1965). See also
Kavanewsky v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of the Town of Warren, 160 Conn: 397, 279 A.2d 567
(1971); note 34 supra.
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in the area." In effect, the court shifted the focus of judicial review
from one that viewed zoning ordinances as primarily affecting the
physical use of land within a specific town, to one that viewed zoning
ordinances as affecting the social structure of an entire region.
Subsequent Pennsylvania cases have placed an even greater burden
on towns seeking to enact minimum lot size ordinances. In Girsh Ap-
peal,45 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reaffirmed the responsibility
of a town to accommodate those wishing to live there. The court sug-
gested that if there is a regional demand for a particular land use, the
town has an affirmative duty to allow such use through zoning. 46 In
Concord Township Appeal,47 also known as the Kit-Mar Builders case,
the same court struck down a local zoning ordinance imposing minimum
lot requirements of two to three acres in a suburban area. In addition
to reasserting the rationale of National Land, that avoiding a future
drain on municipal services was an insufficient zoning objective,48 the
Kit-Mar court questioned the validity of almost all minimum lot zon-
ing, saying that "[a]bsent some extraordinary justification, a zoning or-
dinance with minimum lot sizes such as those in this case is completely
unreasonable." 49
44 National Land & Inv. Co. v. Easttown Township Bd. of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504,
525-28, 215 A.2d 597, 608-10 (1965).
45 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970).
46 Id. at 244-45, 263 A.2d at 398-99. In reviewing the zoning ordinance of Nether Provi-
dence, a small suburb of Philadelphia, the court stated:
[I]f Nether Providence is a logical place for development to take place, it should
not be heard to say that it will not bear its rightful part of the burden.
... If Nether Providence is located so that it is a place where apartment
living is in demand, it must provide for apartments in its plan for future growth;
it cannot be allowed to close its doors to others seeking a "comfortable place to
live."
Id. at 245-46, 263 A.2d at 398-99 (footnotes omitted). The court qualified this affirmative
duty by distinguishing between residential land uses and commercial land use, but made
no distinction among the various residential land uses, leaving it unclear whether a town
has a duty to affirmatively zone for vacation homes and trailer parks if there is a demand
for them. Id., 263 A.2d at 399.
This case suggests that towns have a duty to assess the regional implication of a zon-
ing ordinance before enacting it. However, depending upon the size of a given region,
many small communities are probably incapable, both because of inadequate finances and
unavailable manpower, to undertake such a study. Assuming a town's capability, it is
not clear what stance a reviewing court would take when examining such an ordinance.
It may be that once a regional survey is completed and a zoning ordinance is enacted
pursuant thereto, the presumption of validity of legislative determinations will again
become a strong factor, and the ordinance will be difficult to attack. For a discussion that
suggests Girsh does not mandate regional considerations see, Comment, Exclusionary Zon-
ing from a Regional Perspective, 1972 URBAN L. ANN. 239.
47 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970).
48 Id. at 471-74, 268 A.2d at 767-68.
49 Id. at 471, 268 A.2d at 767 (emphasis added). The court also reiterated a town's
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New Jersey joined the growing trend toward closer judicial scru-
tiny of local enactments in Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of
Madison.50 There the New Jersey Supreme Court invalidated a zoning
ordinance setting forth minimum floor space and lot requirements.5
The court emphasized that Madison had the obligation of justifying
every zoning ordinance not merely on the basis of health and safety but
also on the basis of the general welfare. 52 Recognizing the severe hous-
ing shortage in the area and the exclusionary impact of the ordinance,58
the general welfare was deemed to encompass the housing needs of the
entire region, not just those of Madison."4
This new approach differs significantly from the traditional bases
of examination. It represents a definite trend toward judicial considera-
tion of regional interests in assessing a local zoning ordinance. This
trend is especially true in a suburban setting where the courts are more
likely to impose an obligation on the localities to deal with acute hous-
ing demands.
The extent of this obligation remains unclear. Girsh suggests an
absolute responsibility to accommodate the various land uses desired by
a region, while recent California decisions have suggested local environ-
mental and aesthetic considerations may still be of some importance. 55
Traditional concepts of permissible objectives within the police power
are changing rapidly. No longer are traffic congestion, depreciated
property values, preservation of rural areas, or inadequate municipal
obligation to consider the regional housing needs of the area: "It is not for any given
township to say who may or may not live within its confines, while disregarding the
interests of the entire area." Id. at 474, 268 A.2d at 768-69. The court further em-
phasized that aesthetics, and perhaps even privacy, are little justification for zoning, ex-
pressing the view that houses can be built quite comfortably on lots of considerably less
than one acre. Id. at 470-71, 268 A.2d at 766-67.
50 117 N.J. Super. 11, 283 A.2d 353 (Law Div. 1971).
51 Id.
52 Id. at 15-16, 283 A.2d at 855.
53 According to the court, the probable price of the lots so zoned would be so ex-
pensive as to preclude 90% of the population from purchasing there. Id. at 16-17, 283
A.2d at 356.
54 Id. at 20-21, 288 A.2d at 858; see note 39 supra.
55 In Confederacion de la Raza Unida v. City of Morgan Hill, 324 F. Supp. 895 (N.D.
Cal. 1971), a zoning ordinance designed "'to preserve and enhance the natural amenities
which form the environment of the City of Morgan Hill" (id. at 896) was upheld
against asserted claims of equal protection violations by the prohibition of construction
of a low income housing unit there. In Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Organization
v. City of Union City, 424 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1970), the court ruled it permissible to take
into account aesthetic and environmental factors even though the ordinance may have
an exclusionary effect on low income housing. But see Kavanewsky v. Zoning Bd. of
Appeals of the Town of Warren, 160 Conn. 397, 279 A.2d 567 (1971).
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services sufficient justifications for zoning.56 Comprehensive planned
growth and regional housing needs have replaced them in part. The
net effect is that the strong presumption of validity of local zoning
ordinances has been greatly weakened by an awakened judiciary willing
to examine the laws in their broader social context.
B. Steel Hill Distinguished
In light of this radical departure from previous norms of judicial
review, it is important to determine whether Steel Hill is in harmony
with this developing trend or merely a reaffirmation of traditionally
limited judicial examination of zoning ordinances.
On its face, Steel Hill is difficult to reconcile with the modem
approach. Little attention is paid to the regional impact of the Sanborn-
ton ordinance either in terms of its environmental impact on surround-
ing communities or its effect on those denied access to vacation homes
in Sanbomton. The general welfare is viewed by the court solely from
the perspective of local citizens. More importantly, the court appears to
accept the town's determination of general welfare without deeper
examination. 7 The inconclusive nature of the evidence presented by
the town indicates that a strong presumption of validity is still given to
local legislative determinations.
There is a major element of Steel Hill, however, that is consistent
with the Pennsylvania approach. The court's concern for environmen-
tal preservation 8 parallels the emerging recognition by other courts
that zoning laws can be instruments of social change and are not mere
accommodations of traditional police power and private property rights.
Thus, although not fully considering all the social implications of the
Sanbornton ordinance, the court at least recognized that such broad
implications exist.
The Steel Hill court itself sought to distinguish the two ap-
proaches. The court interpreted the language in the Pennsylvania
56 See notes 20-22 and accompanying text supra.
57 Two of the more recent decisions have indicated that maintenance of open spaces
and preservation of a town's rural flavor are not legitimate public interests, but only
private concerns of the individuals involved. In National Land & Inv. Co. v. Easttown
Township Bd. of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504, 530-31, 215 A.2d 597, 610 (1965), the court
emphasized:
There is no doubt that many of the residents of this area are highly desirous
of keeping [the historic setting of Easttown] the way it is, preferring, quite
naturally, to look out upon the land in its natural state rather than on other
homes. These desires, however, do not rise to the level of public welfare. This is
purely a matter of private desire which zoning regulation may not be employed
to effectuate.
See also Board of County Supervisors of Fairfax County v. Carper, 200 Va. 653, 197
S.E.2d 390 (1959).
58 469 F.2d at 961.
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cases indicating a local obligation to deal with regional demands for
housing only as broad generalities that were inapplicable to the instant
case:
This proposition, invulnerable in its cloak of generality, does not
quite suit the present case. All these cases refer to an unnatural
limiting of suburban expansion into towns in the path of popula-
tion growth where a too restrictive view of the general welfare was
taken.... Instead, appellant here does not seek to satisfy an already
existing demand for suburban expansion, but rather seeks to
create a demand in Sanbornton on behalf of wealthy residents of
Megalopolis who might be willing to invest heavily in time and
money to gain their own haven in bucolic surroundings. 59
Such a statement, however, is not particularly helpful. It is dif-
ficult to understand what an "unnatural limiting" of population is.
If the court meant to say that any zoning ordinance designed to ex-
clude a use for which there is a pressing demand would be invalid,
then the Sanbornton ordinance would seem to fit that definition.60
Moreover, the unduly restrictive view of general welfare, criticized by
the court in Steel Hill,61 involved the same concerns of orderly planned
growth, maintenance of the local rural or historical character, and
detrimental impact on municipal facilities that were asserted by the
residents of Sanbornton. Finally it is not unreasonable to assume, con-
trary to the court's implication, that there is an already existing demand
for housing in the area6O 2 and that the developer, far from creating such
a demand, is only responding to the clearly evident desire to acquire
vacation homes away from suburbia. While the demand may not be
as great as that existing in the Pennsylvania cases, the difference is
one of degree and not of kind.13
A more valid distinction, as recognized by the court,6 4 involves
the nature of the use which is being restricted. While the Penn-
sylvania and New Jersey courts were concerned with limitations on
the availability of land for permanent residences, the court in San-
bornton was confronted with a development designed primarily for
69 Id. at 960-61 (citations omitted).
60 See note 1 supra.
61 469 F.2d at 961.
62 See note 1 supra.
63 Such a difference in the level of demand for suburban residences, as opposed to
rural vacation homes, may, however, constitute a valid distinction since the crush of
urban expansion has been graphically catalogued and constituted the primary basis of
the rationale in National Land, Girsh, and Oakwood at Madison. See also M. BRooKs, supra
note 42. Arguably, however, it is probably only a matter of time until the increase in
demand for leisure facilities in New Hampshire will approach the current level of de-
mand for suburban homes.
64 469 F.2d at 961.
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seasonal living as a second home.65 It may well be that the right of
a citizen to obtain a decent home is paramount to the traditional local
prerogative in legislating the extent of municipal land use, but the
right to own a ski chalet or summer camp in New Hampshire is
presumably not great enough to warrant interference with a town's
right to protect itself against wholesale intrusion by outsiders and the
undesirable ecological side effects which such an invasion might bring.
Perhaps the most distinguishing feature of this case involves the
nature of the alleged environmental claims. In rejecting the contention
that zoning ordinances could be validly enacted to prevent traffic con-
gestion, drainage and sewer problems, and destruction of local beauty,
the Pennsylvania courts have assumed that these problems could be
adequately dealt with by other means.66 However, as the district court
in Steel Hill recognized, the claims of air and water pollution made
by the town cannot be dismissed on the same grounds.67 As long as
such problems remain incapable of easy solution, a court may be quite
reluctant to deny a town the power to protect against what is fast
becoming one of the nation's gravest problems. If, however, new
methods for combating pollution become available, the argument that
zoning may be used to reduce environmental damage may become as
unpersuasive to the courts as the municipal services argument. 68
III
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF Steel Hill
The primary significance of Steel Hill lies in its recognition of
environmental concerns as permissible zoning objectives. By so holding
65 See id.
66 Implicit in the rationale of National Land & Inv. Co. v. Easttown Township Bd.
of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965), was the assumption that traffic congestion
could be corrected by an expansion of the highway system, while sewage and drainage
problems could be met by increased municipal services which the town was obligated to
finance. The desire to preserve open spaces, provide a greenbelt, or maintain historic
sites, to the extent such goals were elevated to public concerns, could best be met by city
purchase, condemnation, eminent domain, or restrictive covenants. To the extent aesthe-
tics were a concern, such considerations could be met by appropriate provisions in the
building codes, or set-back, light and air, and other zoning provisions. See generally Note,
supra note 1, at 131-45.
67 338 F. Supp. at 306.
68 Towns would thus be faced with the financial burden of dealing with air and
water pollution, a burden which may not be so easily met as providing increased munici-
pal services for new residents. Pollution control at the town, village, or city level, how-
ever, would lack the coordination necessary to ensure effective environmental preservation
on a regional basis.
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the court has broadened the scope within which towns may validly
exercise their police power to zone. However, numerous important,
and potentially troublesome, questions are raised by the decision.
As a result of Sanbornton's amended zoning ordinance, all of the
town, except for the highway commercial district, is zoned for a
minimum lot size of at least 1.5 acres. 9 Thus, any feasible plans for
vacation home development are effectively thwarted. While perhaps
not exclusionary in the traditional sense,7 0 the town has completely
denied comprehensive development for residential land use. The court's
opinion suggests that to the extent a desire to dampen the population
increase of Sanbornton motivated the zoning amendment, a greater
population pressure on New Hampshire might subsequently endanger
the ordinance's validity.*1 However, the opinion also appears to suggest
that, regardless of population pressure or impermissible motives, a
showing of sufficient environmental danger will continue to sustain a
Sanbornton-type zoning ordinance.72 Therefore, in seeming conflict
with Girsh7 3 the court may be sanctioning a total exclusion of a par-
ticular land use. If such a zoning practice is followed by similarly
situated New Hampshire communities, the net effect may well be
an exclusionary blanket of restrictive ordinances similar to those that
the Pennsylvania court was explicitly attempting to prevent 4
69 469 F.2d at 959 n.4.
70 The court summarily dismissed any argument that exclusionary zoning was
involved here, primarily because it felt there was an absence of racial or economic
discrimination. Id. at 960 n.5. While the motives of enactment may have been nondis-
criminatory (see notes 29-32 and accompanying text supra) the net effect of the ordinance
seems to be a total exclusion of second-home development. Since arguably only those
financially well-off could afford such homes, it was probably assumed that this was not
the type of discrimination condemned in recent cases. See, e.g., English v. Town of Hunting-
ton, 335 F. Supp. 1369 (E.D.N.Y. 1970); Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madi-
son, 117 N.J. Super. 11, 283 A.2d 353 (Law Div. 1971). See also M. BRooxs, supra note 4, at 3.
71 469 F.2d at 962.
72 While the opinion nowhere explicitly states the precedence of environmental
preservation over accommodation of population growth, the discussion of the legitimacy
of ecological concerns is not conditioned on the degree of demand for land in Sanbornton.
There is language that suggests the court would reconsider its decision upon a showing
of pressure from "land-deprived and land-seeking outsiders." Id. However, this concern
seems directed to a zoning ordinance enacted solely to exclude outsiders rather than to
preserve and to maintain the existing environment. .d.
73 See notes 45-46 and accompanying text supra.
74 National Land & Inv. Co. v. Easttown Township Bd. of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504,
215 A.2d 597 (1965). The court in National Land was worried about each town reacting
to a neighboring minimum lot size zoning ordinance by enacting a similar ordinance to
avoid the influx of those turned away by its neighbor. Id. As the court in Steel Hill indi-
cated: "[W]here there is natural population growth it has to go somewhere, unwelcome
as it may be, and in that case we do not think it should be channelled by the happen-
stance of what town gets its veto in first." 469 F.2d at 962.
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The court's vagueness on the scope of environmental concerns
that can validly be considered by a town and a reviewing court raises
serious questions. The small quantum of evidence accepted by the
court of asserted future pollution raises the possibility that mere al-
legations of environmental damage by towns seeking only to restrict
undesired expansion will sustain local zoning ordinances. The court's
seeming acceptance of general welfare as determined by the town itself
further reinforces that possibility7 5 The issue of what types of eco-
logical harm are valid local zoning concerns is also left unresolved. In
Steel Hill, prospective air and water pollution were held sufficient to
justify the ordinance. Whether either standing alone would have been
sufficient remains unclear.
The failure of the court in Steel Hill to require Sanbornton to
consider its ordinance in terms of its broader geographical impact
seems unduly restrictive in light of the recognized need for regional
planning to conserve the nation's natural resources.76 In the absence
75 Id. at 961.
76 Many commentators have forcefully urged a broader geographical approach to
land use planning. See, e.g., Marcus, Exclusionary Zoning: The Need for a Regional
Planning Context, 16 N.Y.L.F. 732 (1970); McCloskey, Preservation of America's Open
Space: Proposal for a National Land-Use Commission, 68 Micn. L. REv. 1167 (1970);
Comment, The Scope of State and Local Government Action in Environmental Land Use
Regulation, 13 B.C. IND. & Com. L. Rev. 782 (1972). In addition to federal concern for
the environment as embodied in the National Environmental Policy Act (42 U.S.C.
§§ 4321-17 (1970)) several states have promulgated statutes evidencing state movement in
this area. See, e.g., CAL. Gov'T CODEy §§ 65100, 65800 (West 1966); HAWAu Rev. STAT. § 46-
4 (1968). These statutes, however, are still the exception, not the rule. Where the various
legislatures are reluctant to institute regional planning, the majority of courts are unwill-
ing to take the initiative.
Regional planning is urged primarily as a means to ensure the planned, systematic,
and orderly development of the nation's remaining open spaces and to provide for a
rational allocation of population within areas already settled. Regional planning may take
several forms. One would be to require (by state statute) that each town take into con-
sideration regional environmental factors when enacting a zoning ordinance. This is what
seems to have been done in Pennsylvania and New Jersey by court decision. This ap-
proach has the disadvantage of allowing individual towns within a given regional area,
assuming one could be adequately defined by the statute, to make varying assessments
of the needs of the same area, with likely divergent zoning results. This method, if chal-
lenged in the courts, would leave the ultimate determination of what is or is not a proper
zoning consideration to the judiciary. That is perhaps a determination better left to
the legislature. See Marcus, supra at 786.
Perhaps a better plan would be the formulation of a set of policy guidelines insti-
tuted by the state but implemented by regional commissions. See CAL. Gov'r CoDv §§
65300-06 (West 1966). Such a plan could ensure a state-wide comprehensive growth plan.
The drawing of regional lines may present some problem because county lines may not
be useful boundaries. See Board of County Supervisors of Fairfax County v. Carper, 200
Va. 653, 107 S.E.2d 390 (1959) (county zoning ordinance attempting to preserve open spaces
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of any effective regional planning board or state intervention,77 the
court's decision leaves the development or nondevelopment of the
Northeast's remaining unfouled recreation areas to a patchwork quilt
of unintegrated local zoning ordinances.
The most significant problem raised by Steel Hill is determining
its effect on cases factually similar to National Land: that is, what will
be the effect of environmental damage claims asserted in support of sub-
urban zoning ordinances which exclude residential development in re-
gions characterized by housing shortages? This question presents the
issue which the Steel Hill court did not confront: does the right of out-
siders to decent homes outweigh the right of those within a community
to protect and preserve the environment in which they live?78 While
this conflict has not been resolved, Steel Hill may suggest an approach.
Since most suburban areas are, to some extent, already congested and
increasingly subject to contamination and pollution from their urban
neighbors, environmental concerns should not take precedence over
regional housing considerations in zoning enactments. This may involve
giving up on a particular area as ecologically hopeless, but the approach
could be justified by according greater weight to environmental con-
siderations in more pristine and untrammeled areas such as San-
bornton. This would be true regional planning, for one broad policy
would encompass both areas that are now relatively polluted and likely
to become increasingly fouled, as well as other areas which are not yet
in western part of county held invalid); cf. Honeck v. County of Cook, 12 fl1. 2d 257, 146
N.E.2d 25 (1957) (upholding five-acre minimum lot size county zoning ordinance). See gen-
erally AmERICAN Soc'Y OF PLANNING OFFICIALS, PROBLEMS OF ZONING AND LAND USE REGU-
LATION RESEARCH REPORT No. 2 (1968); Marcus, supra at 738-40. For a broad discussion of
the competing goals and policies involved in changing from a local to a regional perspec-
tive, see AMERicAN Soc'Y OF PLANNING OFFICilmS, supra at 7-13.
The ultimate level of supervision and control, of course, would be a federal program
for land use. See, e.g., McCloskey, supra at 1172-74.
17 The court of appeals suggested that the most appropriate procedure in enacting
future zoning ordinances would be the adoption by the state of a statute similar to the
National Environmental Policy Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-37 (1970)), which would require
the developer to submit environmental impact statements. 469 F.2d at 962.
'78 In Town of Groton v. Laird, 353 F. Supp. 334 (D. Conn. 1972), the court rejected
the town of Groton's attempt to use the environmental impact statement requirement
of NEPA to block construction of a low and middle income housing development.
The court stated:
NEPA is not a sort of meta-zoning law. It is not designed to enshrine existing
zoning regulations on the theory that their violation presents a threat to environ-
mental values. NEPA may not be used by communities to shore up large lot and
other exclusionary zoning devices that price out low and even middle income
families.
Id. at 350.
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defiled and which will be allowed to attempt to maintain their rela-
tively unspoiled status. 9
CONCLUSION
Steel Hill does indeed present "[d]ifficult and novel legal and
factual questions."80 Unfortunately these questions are not adequately
answered. Realizing that its decision was injecting a new element into
the hodgepodge of judicial zoning review, the court proceeded cau-
tiously and reminded the parties that the ordinance was certainly open
to subsequent court attack.8' While environmentalists may well re-
joice at this judicial recognition of their concerns within the context of
zoning, only future decisions, which further clarify and define Steel
Hill, will reveal the extent to which such optimism is justified.
Steven M. Wheeler
79 The argument against such an approach would emphasize the inherent unfairness
of allowing one area to zone under standards different from another, an argument that
would be obviated by regional or state control over land-use planning.
This would also probably raise equal protection issues, which might be met by
employing a balance-of-interest test, weighing the benefit to the public of preserving
undeveloped and relatively unpolluted areas versus the private right of an individual to
live in such an area. See Comment, supra note 76, at 788-90. To the extent constitutional
objections could not be overcome, eminent domain proceedings providing for compen-
sation, although expensive, could be employed by the governmental unit.
80 469 F.2d at 959.
81 Id. at 962.
1054
